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The Making of Peace: Jean De Bloch and the First Hague Peace Conference

by Peter van den Dungen

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Center for the Study of Armament and Disarmament
California State University Los Angeles
5151 State University Drive
Los Angeles, CA 90032

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ABOUT THE AUTHORS...

PETER VAN DEN DUNGEN, Lecturer in the School of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford (England), received his Ph.D. from the University of London in 1975. His research interests and publications are largely concentrated in the area of peace history and include The Hidden History of a Peace 'Classic': Emeric Crucé's Le Nouveau Cynée (London, 1980); Foundations of Peace Research (London and Bradford, 1980); and "Varieties of Peace Science: An Historical Note," in Journal of Peace ~~Studies~~ Science (Vol. 2, No. 2, Spring 1977, 239-57). Dr. van den Dungen's previous writings on de Bloch are: A Bibliography of the Pacifist Writings of Jean de Bloch (London, 1977) and "The International Museum of War and Peace at Lucerne," in Schweizerische Zeitschrift fuer Geschichte/Revue Suisse d'Histoire (Vol. 31, 1981, 185-202). Most recently, he has contributed several entries to the Biographical Dictionary of Modern Peace Leaders, 1800-1975.

SANDI E. COOPER, Professor of History at the College of Staten Island, CUNY, received her Ph.D. in History from New York University (1967). As co-editor for the European works of the Garland Library of War/Peace Reprints, she authored 28 introductions and two original anthologies, including Internationalism in Nineteenth Century Europe. Dr. Cooper is also editor for Western Europe of the forthcoming Biographical Dictionary of Modern Peace Leaders, 1800-1975 (general editor, Harold Josephson; to be published by Greenwood); author of several articles on aspects of European pacifism before 1914; former officer of the Conference on Peace Research in History; past president of the Berkshire Conference of Women Historians and the Coordinating Committee on Women in History. Currently, she is preparing a book-length manuscript which surveys European internationalist and pacifist thought and movements, 1815-1914.

In the same fashion that a house-by-house investigation of a single village elucidates the contours of a larger social milieu, so may a microscopic examination of a discrete diplomatic event mirror the dynamics of a historical pattern. Using the First Hague Peace Conference of 1899, Peter van den Dungen carefully exploits an opportunity to reconsider not only the meaning of the unusual assemblage of diplomats but also the manner in which contemporaries and four generations of scholars have evaluated it. Van den Dungen, a specialist in the history of European pacifism and peace movements and a professor in the Peace Studies Program at the University of Bradford (Yorkshire), here demonstrates the importance of non-traditional documentation in completing a balanced picture of an event usually traced through official papers. His foray beyond the typical research confines revives the reality hiding behind that peace conference which has been often ignored or disdained by scholars.

The facts of the Conference are well enough known. In August, 1898, astonished European diplomats accredited to St. Petersburg listened as Count Muraviev read a rescript to them in which the young Tsar, Nicolas II, focused attention on the uncontrolled, expensive arms race of the fin de siècle that threatened to destroy civilization -- either through use of those arms in an unimaginable war or through bankruptcy. The Powers were invited to attend a "peace" conference to explore mutually acceptable means to stem the further escalation of the arms race and to consider international institutions which might be erected for the peaceful resolution of threatening crises. As revealed in the diplomatic documents published after World War I, there was a rash of bewildered, suspicious correspondence, flying among and between ministers, diplomats, home offices and foreign secretaries, all of whom were speculating on the "real" motivation

behind the Tsar's apparent humanitarianism. France was presumably the most astonished and nervous power, for it had received no prior warning of this bombshell -- despite the fact that it was Russia's main ally in Europe. In the following months, according to most accounts, two things became clear. The Tsar had opened a can of worms, risking considerable embarrassment, at the same time as the public was expressing enormous enthusiasm about his century-end initiative. A way, then, had to be found to hold the conference, placate public opinion, and save the Tsar's aplomb ... but to achieve nothing.

The meeting opened in May, 1899 under the presidency of the amiable Baron de Staal, a Russian diplomat with no experience in running a parliamentary meeting -- at least according to some Britons' comments. The assembled diplomatic and military experts quickly found dozens of reasons why even the much modified agenda (van den Dungen reviews its creation) still compromised national interest, challenged sovereignty, or threatened military security. Opinion makers in diplomatic and journalistic circles concluded, during the eight months between August 1898 and May 1899, that impending Russian bankruptcy lay behind the humanitarian gestures of the Tsar; and when the Conference closed, it appeared as if nearly nothing -- apart from some pious Voeux -- had been accomplished. Scholars, by and large, have adhered to both interpretations: that the motivation of financial disaster was the real reason for the Tsar's pronouncement, and that the meeting led to results of no great consequence. These views are based on an analysis of Russia's fiscal condition and are often invoked to demonstrate the impossibility of reaching an international agreement on arms control.

In moving outside the usual diplomatic sources, van den Dungen restores the role of the

remarkable Jean de Bloch, Polish banking wizard and Russian economic adviser, in persuading the Tsar to recognize the dangers of modern war and war preparations. Bloch's theory, contained in a massive six-volume study of war in its technical, economic and political features, was published between 1898-1900 in four languages. (Only the last volume, called The Future of War, appeared in an English translation.) This work represented the culmination of years of research, some of which had been published earlier in articles. Bloch's analysis demonstrated that a war between European nations would probably result in a terrible equality of power where men would dig in, where shovels would become as important as ammunition, and where finances and economies, resources and human sacrifices would be stretched beyond acceptable limits. Such a war would likely produce political upheaval and social revolution. That Bloch managed to reach the Tsar with his findings is demonstrated clearly in this article. That he worked during the Hague Conference to persuade others of his position is equally substantiated. The value of the private papers and publications of Bloch's natural constituency, the contemporary European peace movement, in establishing his role is fully appreciated by van den Dungen. Indeed, van den Dungen also suggests some of the scope of the pacifists' own participation in attempting to shape the outcome of the meeting, a unique private intervention in the usually closed circles of diplomatic discourse.

The Hague Conference, from the publication of the Tsar's Rescript to its final session, riveted the attention of the large and well organized pacifist forces in Europe and the United States. On the initiative of one German woman, Marguerite Selenka, over a million signatures were gathered and dozens of demonstrations held all over the two continents, in support of its objectives. During the course of the meeting, pacifists

congregated at The Hague, mingling and button-holing diplomats at the salon opened by Mme. Waszklewicz van Schilfgaarde for that purpose. English journalists and pacifists, W. T. Stead, G. H. Perris and F. Moscheles issued daily reports on the meetings; Bertha von Suttner kept a diary and peace leaders were overjoyed at the number of official representatives from various governments who were themselves active participants in either international law circles or the Interparliamentary Union. Few diplomatic conferences since 1899 have permitted so much "leakage" and socializing between the private and official worlds. Indeed, the Hague Conference was the first one to see such private lobbying on behalf of such major matters relating to national sovereignty; it was a "first" of its kind.

The meeting was also a "first" in the sense that it was a "peace" conference not charged with concluding hostilities and dividing spoils -- as was typical of the classic peace congresses (e.g. Westphalia, Utrecht, Paris, Vienna or Versailles). Instead, it was a congress charged with organizing positive steps for minimizing the outbreak of war. True, earlier in the century, the Powers had gathered occasionally to sign conventions for humanizing war or protecting the rights of prisoners and wounded, as well as for setting agreements on international behavior in the areas of commerce and communications. It was also true that, from 1872 onward, efforts had been made in European parliaments to institute permanent arbitration treaties, with some modest success. But the great hope of private activists on behalf of an organized peace, and their many supporters in various parliaments, was the idea of a general arbitration treaty. The 1899 Conference constituted the first attempt at turning such a dream into reality. To dismiss the Hague Agreement as a total failure is to fail to read it in its historical context. It was certainly a disappointment; but a small

step was understood to be better than no step at all.

It is also useful to re-examine the proceedings at The Hague themselves in the light of the charge that arms control agreements are nearly impossible, if not impossible, to reach. While many of the diplomatic representatives present were "friends" of peace activists, many military advisers were fully deaf to Bloch's arguments. The German delegation was especially hostile to arms control discussions. Baron von Stengel was the author of the famous pamphlet, Der Ewige Friede, deriding pacifist ideas; and this seems to have been one of the main reasons that he was appointed an adviser to the delegation. While others were not quite as blunt in their view of any arms control, their attitudes ranged from hostility to pure skepticism. The American, Admiral Mahan, and Sir John Fisher of the British Admiralty, were hardly partisan to arms limitation ideas. The German general von Schwarzhoff dismissed the notion that armaments were an exhausting expenditure for Germans or that Germans wanted to do anything less than "their sacred patriotic duty" as soldiers. An Italian officer, General Zuccari, objected that its organic laws prevented Italy from signing any agreement to cease permanent development of its weaponry which even a short "truce" on new deployment would require. The American captain Crozier feared technological paralysis would result from the slightest suspension of research and procurement. The Russian proposal, to declare a few years' truce on weapons proliferation, was supported only by the remarkable Dutch general, den Beer Portugael. Equally, proposals to curtail the use of high explosives or certain field mines were declared unfeasible in terms of national security. The entire issue of arms control or limitation was once again remanded to governments for further study.

None of the military delegations present at The Hague would even consider a small truce (today's word is "freeze") on any form of military development. The very delegates and experts assigned to devise arms limitation agreements were the least likely to be inclined to give such agreements their support. If a committee of corporate vice-presidents were to be charged with writing a labor contract, pension, health and vacation benefits would not be likely to be included in the final package. At The Hague, as at most similar ventures, the foxes were set to guard the chickens; and a close examination of this Conference reveals their recipe for fricassée. Those diplomats who agreed that a tribunal be established before which nations could, if they desired, present their cases, achieved the only success that was possible. No sovereign regime was willing to divest its executive of its unfettered privilege to "act in the national interest" on the international stage. No shred of sovereign power nor of diplomatic practice would be surrendered. To have done so would have been tantamount to carrying out another French Revolution on the international level.

Scholars tend to accept these positions as the realistic consequences of the organization of modern state power and relationships. The claim that these relationships have always been unchanged, a position taken by Bismarck, remains the unexamined premise behind much research. This view tends to overlook the self-interest of the elites who manage international meetings and the bureaucracies which they represent and protect. Bloch, and most late-nineteenth century peace activists, were conservatives, too; but their grasp of conservatism meant finding a system to preserve, not to destroy, the civilization and social order which they dearly loved. To dismiss them as utopians or fantasizers, and to consider the "realistic" politicians as hard-headed practitioners of the "art of the

possible" is to throw into question the meaning of the word, "realism." Professor van den Dungen's essay is an important contribution to the assessment of historical realities.

Sandi E. Cooper

THE MAKING OF PEACE: JEAN DE BLOCH AND THE FIRST HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE

by
Peter van den Dungen

The Hague Conference, which took place from May until July, 1899 at the instigation of Tsar Nicholas II, continues to attract the attention of lawyers, historians, political analysts and chroniclers of the peace movement. This may be somewhat surprising, since very few of the original high expectations held for the Conference were fulfilled, and its final results had no great significance. But for the peace movement, an official peace conference seemed to be the crowning result of almost a century of constant propaganda and agitation, which until then had had little success. It was widely believed that this Conference would be seen by future generations as a milestone on the way to peace. For the lawyers, too, the Conference represented a starting point towards later developments in international law, the law of war and the procedures for the peaceful settlement of international disputes. And historians and political analysts continue to show interest in the Conference because, among other reasons, there is no unambiguous explanation for the Tsar's initiative. The origins of the famous Manifesto of August 12/24, 1898 [1] have long been the subject of speculation [2], with a multitude of motives and as many sources of inspiration attributed to the Tsar. As the discussion has progressed, largely due to the publication of archive materials [3], a more complex theory has emerged, wherein various previously proffered explanations have been synthesized to form a coherent whole.

It is not the aim of this contribution to designate Jean de Bloch as the principal instigator of the Conference by adopting the theory of a single initiative, as it has been applied to Muraviev, Kuropatkin, Witte, Pobedonostsev (respectively ministers of foreign affairs, war, finance, religion), Lamsdorff, Basily (under-secretary and civil servant, respectively, in the Foreign Affairs Department), de Martens (lawyer), Alexandra

Fejodorowna (Tsarina) and, finally, the Tsar himself. (In addition, a number of non-Russians have had their advocates.) Our aim is, rather, to demonstrate that up to now insufficient attention has been devoted to de Bloch's role in the planning and organization of the Conference. Although this role has been briefly mentioned by most researchers, it has never, to our knowledge, been analyzed in detail.[4] The reasons for this neglect are probably to be found in the obscurity which eventually befell de Bloch, as there has always been sufficient material in publication to give a considerably more detailed description of de Bloch's influence than has been available to date. On the basis of this material, we will study not only the emergence and subsequent evolution of the First Manifesto, but also the period between the promulgation of the Manifesto and the beginning of the Conference, when de Bloch was likely to have influenced internal negotiations. De Bloch's own activities at The Hague will also be discussed. Such a broad approach can open up perspectives which would remain hidden if only one facet of the Conference, i.e. its origins, were discussed.

Jean de Bloch was born in Radom, in Russian Poland, in 1836, and grew up in poor circumstances. Nonetheless, he managed to become one of the most important industrialists of his time. He was the founder and administrator of a series of banks and financial institutions in Warsaw, and was deeply involved in the sugar industry, the timber trade and agriculture in Poland. He soon attracted the attention of the Russian government, which entrusted him with the development of its railway network, realized between 1860 and 1885. While engaged in this task, de Bloch became deeply convinced of the importance of the railways -- not only for the economic development of a country, but also in the case of war. This conviction arose from

such activities as a scientific study of the history of Russian finance and an investigation (to which he contributed) of the problems of provisioning posed by a hypothetical siege of Warsaw. In his capacity as the chairman of the Kiev-Brest Railway Company, he often accompanied high-ranking officers and sometimes even the Tsar, to the battlefield andgradually came to realize that the military profession was not aware of the implications of recent industrialization. Instead, it tended to think of future great wars as being not much different from wars which had taken place in the recent past. De Bloch felt that it was his duty to draw attention to new factors, which would play a decisive role in a future, large-scale, war. He believed that these factors would make such a war "impossible," because a traditional victory would no longer be plausible and the victor would suffer as much as the vanquished. Clausewitzian war, war as a rational instrument of national policy, belonged to the past.

De Bloch supported his assertion with great detail -- and in a scientific manner -- with military-technical, economic and political arguments. The developments in armaments were such that they made aggression much more difficult and very costly. This would lead to a protracted, tiring war in the trenches, where the spade would be as important as the gun. However, economic factors would render a long war impossible, because a large part of the active population would be withdrawn from economic life. Production would fall considerably short of needs; distribution would be impeded by the destruction, or the military requisitioning, of the means of transportation; and the financing of necessary imports, mainly food, would be impossible. In short, the economic resources necessary to wage a long war would not be available, and hunger, rather than ammunition, would decide the outcome of the war. This miserable situation on the

battlefield and among the civilian population would constitute a serious threat to the established order, and favor emerging socialist and anarchist movements.

These arguments enabled de Bloch to draw a terrible picture of future war between great powers -- a picture which was not a product of his imagination, but the result of his sober analysis of hard facts. With the help of assistants, de Bloch worked on his study for eight years. It was published ~~at the beginning~~ in the summer of 1898 in six large volumes in Russian and Polish, and soon after was translated into French and German. Its title was: War. Translation of the Russian Work on War in the Future in its Technical, Economic and Political Aspects. The 4000-page work was a sensation and was received with mixed feelings by the military profession. De Bloch was criticized not so much for his studies as for being an outsider whose conclusions, moreover, condemned war. Still, de Bloch stressed that he had not started his research as a pacifist, but with an open mind -- indeed with the aim of writing a work which would help the military to prepare better for a future war. Yet, through his study he had become convinced that the days of waging wars were over, and he was to devote the rest of his full life (he died early in 1902) to the scientific refutation of war.

De Bloch had published the first results of his inquiries in 1892 in Russian and Polish periodicals. Similar articles had followed in French and German military journals. Initial reaction from the military had been positive and encouraged de Bloch to pursue and finally complete, his work in 1898. At that time the manuscript, like every other book, had to be submitted to the censor who, it appears, withheld approval. Eventually the Tsar, for whom a special report was drawn up, allowed its publication. In his famous conversation with W. T. Stead, de Bloch stated that "the book was

referred by the emperor of Russia at my request to the Minister of War, with a request that it should be subjected to examination by a council of experts."[5] That council reported to the Tsar in a favorable manner. As General Narbutt wrote, "the work, not having been written by a military man, inevitably contains erroneous opinions but, on the other hand, is of such importance for the military that it belongs in the hands of all the generals and officers of the general staff."[6] The report also expressed the expectation that the voluminous and technical work would be read by only a few and because of that presented much less of a danger than the popular anti-war novel of Bertha von Suttner, Die Waffen nieder!. Since the censor had not objected to that work, de Bloch's work a fortiori should be treated in the same manner.[7]

Judging from de Bloch's remarks, it would appear that the censor had withheld the book in the first instance and that de Bloch, who was well known at court, had asked the Tsar to reverse this decision if a military commission, especially to be appointed for the occasion, were to produce a favorable opinion on the book. This scenario, which also explains the Tsar's intervention with the censor in a matter of routine, is implicitly confirmed by E. J. Dillon, who wrote that "owing to difficulties with the censure office, (the book's) existence was brought to the notice of the Tsar"[8] -- as we now know, by de Bloch. Further evidence is to be found in a long article which appeared in the Daily Telegraph on 11 January 1900. It contains the following statement: "The Russian censor, very naturally, objected to much in the book, and vetoed its publication. The author appealed from official to official and managed at last to have the matter laid before the Tsar himself. Nicholas II, interested by M. de Bloch's novel theses, had a special report drawn up on the subject. It was not unfavourable."[9] Indeed, the commission of

experts not only approved the book but, according to de Bloch, was of the opinion "that the book was a very useful one and that it was most desirable that it should be placed in the hands of all staff officers ... (and) that no book could contribute so much to the success of the Conference or to the information of those who were to take part in its deliberations."[10] The latter statement is particularly interesting, because it suggests that de Bloch's book was already linked to the Conference at an early stage, when plans must still have been vague. It is possible, therefore, that the appearance of the book and the publicity surrounding it came at an opportune moment for those who wanted a peace conference, whilst confronting its opponents with a new difficulty. Still, we do not want to draw this conclusion. It is sufficient to state that already at an early stage, the Tsar was acquainted with de Bloch's book; this is the first point which can be clearly established.

The Tsar received de Bloch on several occasions to hear him expound his theories, which demonstrates that the Tsar not only knew the work but showed great interest in it. Thus the almost simultaneous publication of the controversial book and the equally surprising Manifesto were not considered coincidences in the West, certainly not by those in the inner circles of the peace movement. De Bloch's audiences with the Tsar were soon confirmed. Shortly after the publication of the Manifesto, Stead undertook his famous peace crusade throughout Europe, in the course of which he also met the Tsar and de Bloch. Stead remarked that a meeting between the two, which was being rumored, had actually taken place; in fact, he noted, "It was not the first time M. de Bloch had enjoyed an opportunity of expounding his conclusions before the ruler of Russia. He had been received by Alexander III. But the difference between the father and the son was most marked. Alexander III listened

courteously but made no remarks, while Nicholas II accompanied and interrupted M. de Bloch's discourse by perpetual questions and comments, which showed the keenness with which he followed the exposition of the subject. A long discourse it was, two hours on end, and in the middle of it M. de Bloch grew weary, and had to halt for breath. But his Imperial listener never wearied and always seemed eager for more."[11] As Stead continues, "The Emperor wished him to sit down, but M. de Bloch said he could talk better standing up. But after holding forth for an hour, he had to rest a little, the Emperor gave him time to recover his strength, and then M. de Bloch went on for another hour. If it had not been that I heard that story from M. de Bloch's own lips," notes Stead, "I should have doubted it. I could not imagine M. de Bloch wearying in the exposition of his favorite theme in six hours, let alone one. When I remarked this to him, he said: 'Yes, but talking to an Emperor is different from talking to other people'."[12]

De Bloch also found the present Tsar a better scholar than his predecessor: "He had tried to impress his ideas upon Alexander III, but although the Peacekeeper of Europe was well disposed to anything that tended to promise a cessation of warfare, he had not the quickness of mind necessary to grasp the full significance of M. de Bloch's teachings. Not so Nicholas II. He listened for two long hours to M. de Bloch, questioned him minutely upon the various points which he brought forward, and showed a firm grasp of the subject which astonished and delighted the veteran propagandist."[13] "Nothing," de Bloch informed Stead, "could exceed the keen, sustained, sympathetic attention with which the Emperor listened to his lengthy exposition of the immensity of the work which needs to be done before the mass of his subjects could be brought up to the standard of the more prosperous people."[14] Finally, at the Hague

article by Ford.[25]

One way by which de Bloch apparently tried to win over the Tsar to his ideas was through the Tsarina. In his memoirs Witte writes about this: "I am told that he made an effort to convert to his pacifistic faith Empress Alexandra soon after her marriage to His Majesty, but that it was labour lost."[26] According to other sources, however, de Bloch's efforts were not in vain, because in the end the Tsar allegedly backed the plan of proclaiming a peace manifesto at his wife's insistence: "One day ... in one of those sudden changes of mood which often characterize those of a weak character, Nicholas II informed his foreign minister that, on the prompting of the Tsarina, he had been won over to the idea."[27] The fact that the Tsar involved his wife in these matters is confirmed by a conversation Kuropatkin had with the Tsar some time after the Manifesto had been published. "Among other things the Tsar told me," writes the Russian Minister of War, "that he had often spoken and consulted with the Tsarina, Alexandra Feodorowna, about the question of disarmament." Nor was the opinion of the Tsarina necessarily in conflict with her, allegedly pacifist, leanings: "The Tsarina voiced the important (according to him, i.e. the Tsar) opinion that it was absolutely necessary to equip our army with quick-firing guns, so as to show the other powers that we have not raised the issue of disarmament because we have exhausted our means of rearming."[28] Furthermore, Muraviev told Kuropatkin that the Tsar had read the draft of the Manifesto to the Tsarina as many as three times, and Michael Priklonsky, a high functionary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, gathered from a conversation with the Tsarina the firm impression that she had had a decisive influence on the Tsar's judgment.[29]

Finally, there is yet another good reason to

assume that de Bloch found a willing ear with the Tsarina. His philanthropy, like hers, was aimed in particular at poverty-stricken women; as Dillon comments, "Amid all his occupations ... the question of bettering the lot of women of the lower orders was always present to the mind of the great reformer and nearest his heart. And one of his best and most useful works is devoted to showing how the welfare of the Russian Empire turns mainly upon that central point, and to a consideration of the ways and means of effecting the desirable change. A couple of years ago, the Empress of Russia, whose views on the subject do credit to her mind and her heart, sent for M. de Bloch and requested him to afford her all the assistance he could command in translating his theories into institutions. Delighted at the scope thus unexpectedly offered him, he made a thorough study of the whole question, and sent in voluminous reports, exhaustive statistics, practical proposals, spending a considerable portion of his fortune in laying the foundation of a work which he knew would not bear fruit until long after he had passed away from the scene of his labours".[30] It would seem only natural to assume that de Bloch used the good will sown in this way to try to convert the Tsar to his peace ideas. And what we know about the relationship between de Bloch and the Tsarina and between the latter and the Tsar must, in our view, be taken into account in an appraisal of de Bloch's influence on the immediate genesis of the Hague Conference.

The opinion that de Bloch's vision influenced the Tsar and was also responsible for the issuing of the Rescript not only prevailed among peace propagandists (who were described as being naive), but was also expressed repeatedly in diplomatic circles. As early as August 31, 1898, the Austrian ambassador to St. Petersburg sent a secret message to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Vienna, drawing attention to de Bloch's book and indicating the

Tsar's interest in it: "His first audience with the Czar lasted two hours, and His Imperial Majesty has commanded the publication of the text, and the work has been in the bookshops for two weeks. As a result, Herr von Bloch has been received by the Czar on five further occasions in long audiences, and later in May on many occasions by the Czarina."[31] In his report of a conversation he had with the German Emperor on December 19, 1898, the British ambassador in Berlin, Sir F. Lascelles, wrote as follows: "The proposal, His Majesty said, no doubt originated with the Emperor himself, who had been reading a book by a Warsaw banker named de Bloch, which was ably written in a philanthropic and humanitarian sense, and which had strongly impressed upon His Majesty the necessity for him to do something to mitigate the horrors of war, and to prevent the wholesale destruction of human life. The proposal was warmly adopted both by Count Mouravieff and M. de Witte." Yet while the British envoy added, "His Majesty went on to say that it was easy to see that this proposal originated with M. de Witte"[32], the Dutch ambassador (in a letter dated April 19/May 1, 1899) informed his minister that de Bloch was called "the father of the conference"[33] in St. Petersburg. Finally, we must mention an interesting letter dated July 13, 1899, from the German ambassador to St. Petersburg, von Radolin, to his Chancellor, von Hohenlohe. In this extensive letter, von Radolin reports on a discussion he had with Komarow, a high functionary of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, regarding the origins and the development of the Tsar's peace idea. Having pointed out the Tsar's love for peace, Komarow said, "The finance minister, Witte, who knew the Emperor's dispositions, made use of these to draw the attention of his Majesty to the well-known book by Mr. Bloch. Bloch was received in a lengthy audience, and succeeded so well in gaining the Emperor's interest in his work that his Majesty, in 1898,

commissioned the preparation of a memorandum on 'disarmament'."[34] To be sure, von Radolin also asserted that Muraviev assured him that it was out of the question that de Bloch had influenced the Tsar, and the editors of the correspondence noted that Witte had informed von Radolin along the same lines. But what has to be taken into account in these well-known dismissals of de Bloch's role are the personal interests which motivated the main actors involved in spreading their specific versions. What we know of Muraviev's and Witte's characters certainly urges such considerations, especially since de Bloch never seemed to seek the limelight as an important personage himself.

Actually, von Radolin's letter to von Hohenlohe contains much more than Komarow's assertion that the Tsar had come into contact with de Bloch's work through Witte [35] and, after a conversation with him, had decided to have a disarmament memorandum prepared. The Russian functionary goes into great detail about subsequent events. The head of the Asian Department of Foreign Affairs, Basily, was charged with the preparation of this memorandum, mainly because he had been present at the Interparliamentary Union Congress held in Budapest in September, 1896. Basily was then the Russian consul general in that city, and forwarded a report on the Congress to the Tsar, who seems to have been lastingly impressed [36]. Basily now devoted himself enthusiastically to the task allotted to him and finally, after many digressions, finished up with the Manifesto of August 12/24. Reaction to the Manifesto, in Russia and especially in France, was instantaneous and disapproving. Muraviev and Kuropatkin had to visit France to calm a panic reaction, and Muraviev subsequently persuaded the Tsar to abandon the whole plan. But when he prepared a note to this effect and presented it to the

commissioned the preparation of a memorandum on 'disarmament'."[34] To be sure, von Radolin also asserted that Muraviev assured him that it was out of the question that de Bloch had influenced the Tsar, and the editors of the correspondence noted that Witte had informed von Radolin along the same lines. But what has to be taken into account in these well-known dismissals of de Bloch's role are the personal interests which motivated the main actors involved in spreading their specific versions. What we know of Muraviev's and Witte's characters certainly urges such considerations, especially since de Bloch never seemed to seek the limelight as an important personage himself.

Actually, von Radolin's letter to von Hohenlohe contains much more than Komarow's assertion that the Tsar had come into contact with de Bloch's work through Witte [35] and, after a conversation with him, had decided to have a disarmament memorandum prepared. The Russian functionary goes into great detail about subsequent events. The head of the Asian Department of Foreign Affairs, Basily, was charged with the preparation of this memorandum, mainly because he had been present at the Interparliamentary Union Congress held in Budapest in September, 1896. Basily was then the Russian consul general in that city, and forwarded a report on the Congress to the Tsar, who seems to have been lastingly impressed [36]. Basily now devoted himself enthusiastically to the task allotted to him and finally, after many digressions, finished up with the Manifesto of August 12/24. Reaction to the Manifesto, in Russia and especially in France, was instantaneous and disapproving. Muraviev and Kuropatkin had to visit France to calm a panic reaction, and Muraviev subsequently persuaded the Tsar to abandon the whole plan. But when he prepared a note to this effect and presented it to the

Tsar, the latter vacillated for more than a month. In the end, the note was made public, since the French had changed their minds in the meantime, insisting that the Conference take place after all. As Komarow explains, "Mr. Bloch came to Petersburg and learned from Mr. Basily, who showed him the draft (of the cancellation), that the whole project seemed to have been abandoned. With Jewish tenacity he refused, however, to be discouraged, and went to see Count Muraviev, whom he heaped with reproach. Without suspecting that Mr. Basily had been tattling, Count Muraviev declared that the idea for a Conference had not been dropped at all. Mr. Bloch then travelled to Paris, and allegedly succeeded, singlehandedly, in persuading the French to support the Conference."[37] The Russians, as a result, felt compelled to carry out their original plan and on December 30, 1898/January 11, 1899 published a Second Manifesto. This one had been drawn up with the collaboration of the lawyer, de Martens, and contained some elements of the insubstantial agreement which Kuropatkin had concluded with his French colleague, Chanoine, in the course of his recent visit to Paris. (The agreement, inter alia, contained a prohibition on the use of explosives dropped from balloons.)

De Bloch was furious. Komarow, according to von Radolin, described de Bloch's reaction as follows: "Mr. Bloch is totally exasperated at the dubiousness and superficiality of this document, and sees himself impelled to send the Emperor a memorandum which is said to be a masterpiece. He points out that the note of December 30 is an absurdity and unlikely to lead to any practical result. Being himself of a mystical disposition (sic), Mr. Bloch plays on the mystical inclinations of the Emperor and convinces him through his memorandum that the entire program is wrongly conceived."[38] In quick succession, the Tsar now lost his head and became skeptical, Count Pahlen refused to

lead the Russian delegation to The Hague, and Baron de Staal, the ambassador in London, was finally and against his will, charged with this task -- without clear instructions. Basily, too, was at the end of his tether and entrusted his collaborator, Hessen, with the job of preparing a set of guidelines for the Russian participants at the Conference. Without any further instructions, accompanied by Basily and Hessen, de Staal eventually travelled to The Hague.[39]

Thus de Bloch's intervention in connection with the Conference is mentioned three times in von Radolin's letter: as (co)inspirer of the Tsar's First Manifesto, as savior of the project thanks to his negotiations in France, and as a critic of the Second Manifesto. Komarow's references to de Bloch's role cannot be dismissed lightly and deserve to be heard, there being no evidence to show that Komarow was seriously mistaken.[40] However, Komarow's comments have, to our knowledge, never been fully considered until now. In Ford's article, already referred to, Komarow's comments are only mentioned briefly, to underline Basily's known role in the origins of the Hague Conference -- "Komarow ... gave the same story with additional variations."[41] The new and important facts, which Komarow had to report about de Bloch are completely ignored. In a study by Ralston (in which he seems to be referring to the same document), only the fact that Witte allegedly called the Tsar's attention to de Bloch's book, -- which led to the audience and the commission to draw up a memorandum -- is given a cursory mention. However, nothing at all is said about de Bloch's further role.[42]

De Bloch's criticism of the Second Manifesto is also mentioned in the letter, already referred to, from van Stoetwegen to de Beaufort. In it, the ambassador mentions Muraviev's confidence that, notwithstanding the opposition of almost

all the Great Powers, particularly Germany, all difficulties would be dispelled through the strength of an aroused public opinion. Muraviev also waxes enthusiastic about the persuasive powers of de Staal, a charming and attractive man whom nobody could resist. Van Stoetwegen admits that he, too, is impressed by de Staal's qualities, but still has to ask himself whether these can prevail over von Stengel and his associates.[43] Fortunately, he continues, Russia has still more trumps in the game -- a specific reference, in particular, to de Bloch, "a very remarkable man with whom I have had several long interviews, (who) assures me that the General Staffs of the Army and Navy are hard at work so as to be in a position to reply to the attacks which were occasioned by the eight points, enumerated in the Russian circular of 30th December, and to the objections which they provoke. According to my speaker," van Stoetwegen continues, "these eight points, which, so to speak, constitute the Russian program, have been wrongly chosen, even more badly drafted, show a slapdash approach, lack unity, do not comply with the Emperor's ideas, and will be the reason why the Conference is destined to fail miserably." Thus the respective expectations of Muraviev and de Bloch differ considerably, concludes the ambassador, who does not feel that he can make a personal choice, but expresses the hope that truth will be found in the golden middle, which it always seems to prefer.[44]

De Bloch's dissatisfaction with the Second Manifesto was understandable. Originally, disarmament and compulsory arbitration procedures for large international conflicts were to have been the focal points of the forthcoming Conference; yet these themes disappeared into the background in the Second Manifesto, with six of its eight items covering the regulation and limitation of warfare. The new agenda thus complied more neatly with the

wishes of the foreign governments and in particular with those of their military advisers who might well have been interested in discussing measures to limit war, but not measures to prevent it or even -- complete utopia! -- to do away with it. Those who strove for the latter goal were not happy with this fundamental change in aim; for them the contents of the Second Manifesto had been watered down too much. As Bertha von Suttner remarked, the Conference would be run at a Red Cross level, and to the obvious satisfaction of quite a few: "Here, also those who are not opponents of war and militarism, and who believe in the inevitability of war, want to cooperate. The six points in question have been drafted, therefore, out of diplomatic consideration for the doubters and the half-hearted -- as a first step, a cautious beginning on the road to a secure peace." But according to her and many other pacifists, such an approach could not lead to the declared goal: "... the road to peace ... cannot be constructed by levelling and modifying the roads of war, no more than the improvement of a street going north can help someone advance on the street going south."[45]

The Austrian pacifist had, in fact, direct reason to feel disappointed. When Muraviev had met her in Vienna in the autumn of 1898 (after the Tsar's Manifesto had been proclaimed), he had clearly given her a different impression of the aims of the planned conference. According to von Suttner's diary, the statesman had told her that "... a war in the future is surely a thing of horror and ruin, -- really an impossible thing; to take care of the present huge armies in the field is impracticable. The first result of a war waged between the great powers will be starvation." Moreover, von Suttner -- quite correctly, in our view -- had "detected the echo of de Bloch's doctrine in those last words, and that justifies the assumption that the work of the Russian

councillor had helped to give the impulse to the drawing of the Rescript. Only de Bloch had added to the word 'starvation' two others, 'revolution' and 'anarchy'."[46] W. T. Stead, who was just then returning from his visit with Nicholas II and de Bloch, had further informed her of de Bloch's expectations of the Conference: "... my (i.e. de Bloch's) idea of what might be done with the most advantage is, that the Congress after its first meeting should appoint a committee or committees of the ablest of its members to conduct what would be an international inquiry into the extent to which modern warfare, under the modern conditions of society, had practically become impossible without sacrifices of life hitherto unheard of on the battlefield, without total dislocation of the fabric of society, and without inevitable bankruptcy and revolution." This was the abyss into which the states were descending ever faster. The task of the Conference was to open their eyes to the total situation, i.e. to look at future war from not only a military-technical, but also an economic and socio-political point of view. "After the committees had completed their inquiry, the results could be reported to an adjourned meeting of the Congress, which would then busy itself with providing some other method of adjudicating international disputes than that of war, which would then be perceived to have become absolutely impossible."[47] Indeed, de Bloch was able to refer to an earlier, internal French proposal in which Burdeau, the Minister of the Navy, had wanted to appoint a committee of economists to report on the economic consequences of war. Unfortunately, this plan had been stopped by the military, who preferred the French public to be kept ignorant of the likely results of a new war. Precisely such an initiative, de Bloch felt, was needed for the Conference which was now in the offing.[48]

A letter which Sir C. Scott, the British ambassador to St. Petersburg, sent to the First

Lord of the Treasury, Balfour, shortly after the publication of the First Manifesto, supplies evidence that the Russian government had, in fact, intended to organize the Conference in this manner. It quotes Muraviev to the effect that "it might be found desirable to appoint a preliminary commission of experts, military, financial and commercial to formulate subjects for discussion."[49] Considering the importance which de Bloch attached to such a commission (composed mainly of economic experts) and the fact that Muraviev was not known for original ideas or new initiatives [50], it is likely that Muraviev borrowed this idea from de Bloch, who at that time still had reason to hope that the Conference would follow his suggestions. But with the rejection of the First, and the publication of the Second, Manifesto de Bloch became increasingly concerned. If the Conference were to busy itself mainly with the laws of war, it was a lost cause; even if organized after the Conference had already begun, study groups would be the only hope for tackling the real problem and preserving something of the Conference's high purpose. As de Bloch told the Daily Chronicle at the opening of the Conference, the results would be more than satisfactory if the Conference just offered an opening for the peace idea, for the "thin edge of the peace wedge."[51]

This now became de Bloch's only concern. In a message from Warsaw, dated April 8, 1899, he informed von Suttner that "In my opinion it would be best for an agitation to be made, to the end that the Conference in pleno, or that single states, should inaugurate an investigation as to the possibility of carrying through a great war. At this moment the governments are not humble enough, public opinion is not as yet ripe enough, to be able to obtain results from the Conference. It would be much more practical if the sessions could be postponed until autumn, so as to let

the separate states have time for arranging investigations and preparing public opinion."[52] Later that month de Bloch travelled to London and to Paris and we can safely assume that, even at this late stage, he did everything possible to promote this idea in both places. The journal of the London Peace Society, for instance, referred to de Bloch's visit, "eagerly discussing in a variety of languages the questions largely to be raised at the Hague Conference."[53] One week before the opening of the Conference, von Suttner received the following telegram from de Bloch: "... In case Conference at the beginning fails to institute serious investigations, (I) plan to form a committee which shall undertake this work. I have letters from Prussian generals which show that the idea is already ripe. I am ready to guarantee the expenses. It would be very desirable using Vienna as a rendezvous, to secure a number of names of political economists and statisticians, and, if possible, of military men. I think that, for execution of the plan, reporters on special divisions of my work, or independent workers, should be nominated, who subsequently should be coordinated through a central committee. Any other method, however, equally acceptable."[54] But as determined as de Bloch still was, at that point, to push through his idea, the Conference took the way of least resistance and did not create any commission. A few months later, de Bloch took the initiative himself and, during a speech delivered in Paris, invited the members of the French Association for Political Economy to answer a number of specific questions regarding the economic consequences of a future war.[55] He obviously assumed that they could only confirm the results of his own study.

It was also on this occasion that de Bloch expressed his astonishment that the opinions of outstanding military men -- such as von Moltke, von der Goltz, Langlois, etc. -- had not been

heard at the Conference; their assessment of the character of future wars was similar to his own. But the diplomats had deemed these matters to lie beyond their own competence and professional expertise, while their military advisers had lacked the authority, the courage and the will to bring such controversial topics into the open. There is no doubt that the military knew of disturbing studies, but preferred to ignore the issues which they raised; in fact, they did all they could to keep the matter silent. De Bloch could well have reconciled himself with this state of affairs, had he been the only one to propound his theory and had he met with only rebuffs from the military. However, as de Bloch insisted, even the most eminent experts broadly agreed with him.[56] Thus, shortly before the opening of the Conference, he received a letter from General Miliutin who, for eighteen years, had been the Russian Minister of War: "The main object of your work has been to draw a picture, faithful but terrible, of that war which in a future more or less near will ruin Europe in order to allow recent inventions to be utilized. For that very reason your book would have an immense and beneficient effect if it could influence the directing spheres, the men who shape the policy of States, and above all other, the Delegates to the Conference at The Hague."[57] Similar support came from Bertha von Suttner, who wrote about de Bloch's book: "It is to be hoped that it has not remained unknown to any of the delegates sent to The Hague"[58], and Russia's best known militant pacifist, Leo Tolstoy, stated, "It is a very interesting book. It is of great value. It will serve a great purpose if everyone reads it."[59] Significantly, Tolstoy was far less impressed by the forthcoming Conference; on the contrary, he strongly condemned the Tsar's proposals and forecast their failure. Wars were very closely linked to states and governments as they now existed; they could do nothing for peace without jeopardizing their

own future. Therefore, the whole Conference was hypocritical, although not necessarily by intent. As a Christian anarchist he acknowledged only individual conscience as a genuine guide for people's behavior and only when everyone reached that insight could war actually be banned. He told this to the many correspondents and visitors from abroad who wanted to know his opinion about the Tsar's proposal.[60] In War Against War! (Stead's weekly paper which sought to prepare the public for the Conference through the winter and spring of 1899), Tolstoy published an article "which was a direct attack upon the Rescript, holding it up to ridicule and contempt, and propounding principles which, in the opinion of the Russian censor (and not only of the Russian censor) would, if adopted, lead directly to anarchy and the destruction of all government."[61]

As dissatisfied as de Bloch was with the change in the original Conference goals, it was not in his nature to give up; nor would he on this occasion. He was very active in order to save what could be saved, not only before the Conference, but also during the meetings in The Hague, between May 18 and July 29. There was probably not much to be expected from the official deliberations, but every opportunity to exercise influence, however small, had to be used. Furthermore, the Conference, through the presence of so many "mighty of the world" or their delegates, offered a unique opportunity for making his theories known. One of the lessons the members of the peace movement had learned from history was that those who presented new ideas rarely met with immediate recognition. Yet, to be able to harvest later, one had to sow now; The Hague constituted a uniquely fertile ground. De Bloch arrived at the Conference on the day following its solemn opening and stayed five weeks, that is until after the end of the actual discussions. From newspaper reports and from the writings of

various people who attended the Conference or followed it closely -- reporters, official delegates, representatives of peace organizations -- one gathers the impression that he must have been the most remarkable individual in this heterogeneous company.[62] Of course, almost everyone knew that de Bloch had had a certain influence on the origin of the Conference, and had heard of his audiences with the Tsar and of his impressive study; but nobody knew the inside story, and de Bloch more than anyone else was the subject of speculation surrounding the motives of the Tsar. No wonder that there was great interest in the man who had allegedly inspired the Tsar, and who had apparently succeeded in persuading Nicholas II to call this Conference -- something which shortly before had appeared impossible.

This interest in de Bloch was further kindled by his announcement, one week after the opening of the Conference, that he would organize a series of public lectures. These lectures, four altogether, took place in the first two weeks of June, and were held in the evening. They dealt with the theme of his great work, and more specifically with (a) the development of firearms, (b) the difficulties encountered following the mobilization of large armies, (c) war at sea, and (d) war in the future from the economic point of view.[63] These addresses, presented in French and illustrated with slides, were very successful and were much discussed at social gatherings throughout the Conference, including the formal meals which followed de Bloch's presentations. After the end of de Bloch's last presentation, Bertha von Suttner wrote: "In the history of the Hague Peace Conference the series of Bloch's lectures will one day be recognized as having been one of its main features. I have been witness to the deep impression and the interest stimulated all round (by his lectures) and their further persistent influence can be confidently foreseen. ...The commotion which these

presentations, held at the historical place of the first peace conference, caused throughout the world, has also guaranteed the dissemination of the ideas which underlie them, and at the same time has provided those opposing war with a new, hitherto unsuspected power."[64]

With the help of his scientific method, de Bloch had now reversed the idea that peace was the utopian concept rather than war. Up to then it was felt that the great war of the future was inevitable; de Bloch, however, affirmed that it had become "impossible," and reached this conclusion on the basis of empirical findings. Hence Bertha von Suttner demanded that Philip Zorn, the scientific member of the German delegation and professor of law at Bonn, should prove equally thoroughly his allegations that de Bloch's theories were based on faulty evidence. Indeed, von Suttner declared, it was not on the basis of figures and scientific laws that faulty conclusions were reached, but through abstract philosophizing and mere speculation. If one alleged that de Bloch's conclusions were wrong, then, equally, such criticisms should be substantiated with figures and "hard data." What proofs were there that a new war would not be totally destructive, or what assurances were there that wounded soldiers would be properly taken care of, as well as whole populations afflicted by hunger and epidemics? Neither Zorn, nor any other of de Bloch's opponents, made the slightest effort to produce these proofs. Precisely here, according to von Suttner, lay the novelty and the liberating aspect of de Bloch's work: the requirement to produce conclusive evidence for the theory one adhered to. De Bloch did not demand that his theory be taken on trust but wanted people to study the problem themselves, to investigate the questions thoroughly and to answer them honestly. In this way it was hoped that many, including the present delegates, would make de

Bloch's vision their own: "The defenders of war will now be answerable for their position, and when, for this purpose, they begin to investigate and draw conclusions, most of them will join the other side. And that is why it can be hoped that most of those condemning future wars will come from among the ranks of the experts, i.e. the soldiers." Besides, she averred, this was the position of Russia's First Warlord who, in his Manifesto of August 24, had drawn the nations' attention to the fact that in the future their highest duty would be to avoid the disaster which was threatening the whole world.[65] Von Suttner also did not let the opportunity pass to introduce Zorn and de Bloch to one another, hoping "perhaps something useful will emerge from this exchange of ideas."[66]

With the same thought in mind, de Bloch tried to talk to as many delegates as possible -- something which did not prove difficult for him, since the interest was often mutual. On such occasions de Bloch would hand out copies of his great work, and he subsequently visited all leading delegates to clarify his conclusions in person. Everywhere he was met with respect, and many were strongly impressed.[67] Fried reported that de Bloch was received with open arms by most delegates and that his advice was sought from all corners. Owing to years of study he had completely mastered the subjects which were to be, or rather should have been, discussed at the Conference -- more so than any of the delegates.[68] Thus it is not surprising that his lectures drew almost all the delegates, including the chairman of the Conference, de Staal.[69] As the Secretary of the London Peace Society wrote about his visit to the Conference: "Among the incidents of the fortnight, not the least interesting, were a series of lectures ... by de Bloch ... They were acknowledged as being not only impressive but most convincing and opportune."[70] His American colleague, Benjamin F. Trueblood,

Secretary of the American Peace Society, also was very much impressed by the enthusiasm with which de Bloch presented his lectures: "I never saw any one more absolutely possessed of his subject. He did not, would not, and I suppose could not talk about anything else."[71] Moreover, de Bloch was well liked by the journalists, who knew that they were always welcome and that a visit to de Bloch would never fail to produce interesting copy. The special correspondent of an English illustrated weekly, which devoted much attention to the Conference, saw de Bloch in his Scheveningen hotel, "where he can be found the best portion of the day ensconced amid piles of volumes, brochures, pamphlets and typewritten documents, all intended for distribution among the delegates of the Conference.[72] The Baron ... is a modest but thoroughly earnest citizen and will entertain the visitor by the hour with detailed descriptions of the horrors of modern warfare, to illustrate which he has numerous charts, maps, photographs and engravings within arm's reach." The article was preceded by a large portrait of de Bloch, captioned, "The Man who made the Peace Conference", and the publisher emphasized once again that de Bloch "commands the attention of many important delegates."[73]

But when de Bloch talked about war, he examined it from many aspects, as is also shown in his book.[74] The correspondent of the London Times noticed this, as well, writing to his chief editor, "de Bloch ... is a charming old gentleman but the most diffuse talker I have ever heard. He jumps from one subject to another - from technical military matters to the most abstract perpetual-peace theories - so that it is impossible to follow him. People here like him but think him rather tiresome."[75] The writer, who was often seen in de Bloch's company, obviously did not share this last opinion. He assured Bertha von Suttner, who expressed her surprise at the

representative of such a bellicose paper as the Times showing interest in de Bloch's theories, "that he was entirely captivated by the theories of the Russian councillor of state." Later she found once more: "Lavedo (sic) has become increasingly captivated by de Bloch; he assures me that he has become a real disciple of his."[76] On the other hand, the correspondent of the Manchester Guardian, reporting that the English accredited minister, Sir Julian Pauncefote, and Sir John Ardagh, besides many other delegates, attended de Bloch's lectures, wrote: "Some were much interested; others, particularly military experts, were ruffled."[77] Count Nigra, the Italian delegate, was spellbound by de Bloch's explanations.[78] His Austrian colleague, however, regretted that they "failed, through their excessively dry character, to have the success they deserved."[79] The chairman of the Conference, de Staal, considered de Bloch "a remarkable man." He told von Suttner: "He wants to prove that peace is no longer a Utopia, but that, in the present state of arms and armies, it is Utopia for civilized nations to wage war. And," he added, "he may be right."[80] Finally, Andrew D. White found de Bloch "interesting, full of ideas, and devoted most earnestly to a theory that militarism is gradually impoverishing all modern states, and that the next European war will pauperize most of them."[81] Hence, when de Bloch left The Hague, Bertha von Suttner could rightly assert, "His lectures here have created the most lively interest and produced much good ..." But she also had to add to this: "... as they caused him much vexation. Many of the military delegates have been very offended by his expositions, and reported him to their superiors."[82]

Apparently, it was in the main the Russian military delegates who were displeased with de Bloch's lectures.[83] De Bloch spoke most freely about topics which were rarely discussed

in public by Russian subjects. After his first lecture he was warned that it might be wise to show more prudence in his remaining talks. De Bloch was not to be intimidated, notwithstanding ominous hints and rumors among the Russian delegation, in whose alarmed minds the speaker appeared to be working his way to Siberia. According to Stead, from whom we gather this information, the problem revolved around the misinterpretation, by Russian officers, of de Bloch's comments on their blunders.[84] The military and naval experts who accompanied every delegation were resentful and impatient when they listened to his theory that the developments in the waging of war and in socio-economic life had made war well-nigh impossible; moreover, senior conference members could not, according to Stead, make the mental effort required to accept a thesis which pointed to such radical conclusions.[85] Fried noted that de Bloch was the target of those who were not in favor of the peace movement and that he was damned by them threefold as a Jew, a Russian and a peace activist.[86] In this respect, the head of the German delegation, Count Münster, expressed himself with quite undiplomatic candor to von Bülow. "The Conference," he wrote, "has attracted the worst political rabble of the entire world, newspaper writers of the worst kind such as Stead, baptized Jews like Bloch, 'peace-women' like Frau von Suttner ... This whole lot ... works quite openly under Russian protection."[87] Indeed, the Germans had been opposed to the Conference from its start, seeing in it only a Franco-Russian maneuver to deceive them. It is obvious that de Bloch, because of this suspicion, wished to dissociate himself from the Tsar and official Russia, at least in part. Thus he was annoyed when an industrious reporter called him the personal confidant of the Tsar at the Conference [88] -- an assumption which was probably quite logical at the time. Although de Bloch was not a member of the official Russian delegation [89], his

influence was well known. We now have every reason to believe that de Bloch represented himself at the Conference and was not involved in intrigues at the Tsar's request. That de Bloch could operate so freely -- and in complete opposition to the opinions of some of the Russian delegates -- is indicative both of his good relationship with the Tsar (and/or the Foreign Office), and also of the previously mentioned "laissez-faire" attitude which the Russian government adopted in relation to the Conference, long before it actually took place.

Theodor Herzl's diary provides us with an interesting insight into de Bloch's behind-the-scenes operations.[90] Herzl hoped to use the Conference to propagate the idea of Zionism and, above all, to get in touch with people from the Tsar's entourage. Towards these ends, he financed von Suttner's stay in The Hague. Von Suttner introduced him to de Bloch shortly after his arrival; Zionism, however, was not discussed until a few days later. De Bloch had no strong objections to it and declared that he was prepared to do everything possible to arrange an audience with the Tsar. He also told Herzl about his own meetings with the Tsar and Tsarina -- describing the latter as "strongheaded and big-hearted" -- and ventured that the Tsar might possibly receive Herzl and even prepare a manifesto in favor of Zionism.[91] Herzl then repaid de Bloch's favor in the following way. In mid-June, the German delegate Zorn had presented a statement to the Conference to the effect that the installation of a court of arbitration was not compatible with the sovereign rights of kings and the independence of states. As a result of this Herzl feared that two blocks might arise, one in favor of, and the other against, the court of arbitration. Herzl wanted to bring this danger, which might have meant the collapse of the Conference, to the attention of the German Emperor and he did this -- on de Bloch's urging -- by writing to the Grand-Duke

of Baden.[92] Zorn was recalled to Berlin, probably as a result of Herzl's letter. Shortly afterwards, when Herzl was preparing to leave The Hague, de Bloch asked him to stay. However, Herzl did not change his mind, "although de Bloch kept reminding me of the historic significance of the Conference." He had contributed in a small way to its success -- "I had done my little bit" -- and he did not wish to wait any longer for an answer from the Grand-Duke, which, in any case, he thought quite improbable. Later the Tsar received a summary of the letter in St. Petersburg via de Staal, to whom de Bloch had given it for forwarding.[93]

During one of their meetings in The Hague, de Bloch reported to Herzl what the Tsar had told him about the origins of his peace initiative. The first proposal had come from the Austrian emperor. Subsequently, the German emperor wanted to appropriate the idea and promulgate it in Palestine (sic). The Russians then decided to be a step ahead of him, because the prestige of the Tsar was still too frail to let him play second fiddle: the Russian people would never accept the idea if they had the impression that the Tsar was only the Emperor's follower.[94] On this as on several other occasions, de Bloch always showed prudence in answering questions about his role in the inception of the Conference. Thus a correspondent of the Times reported after an interview: "M. de Bloch does not admit that the Conference suggested itself to the Tsar after reading his book ... as a matter of course."[95] Earlier on he had answered a suggestion made by Bertha von Suttner: "The service ascribed to me is ... only the result of the movement against war which has been going on, and in which you personally ... have taken such an important part." He continued by returning von Suttner's compliment: "I must bear witness that your personal talent, in my opinion, has accomplished more than all

technical arguments can possibly accomplish."[96] In the final analysis, however, de Bloch maintained that neither von Suttner, nor he himself, nor anyone else, could claim the honor of inspiring the Russian sovereign. With this declaration he wanted to go beyond the futile and idle search for a single originator, stressing instead the most fundamental and general source of the very idea of a peace conference. There were indeed sufficient indications that such an idea had been in the air for some time and that one sovereign or another would eventually have decided to call a conference. In de Bloch's view it was unimportant that in the end this conference be called through the intervention of Nicholas II: "The noble initiative of the Emperor of Russia is not only due to his good-heartedness, as his adversaries would have us believe, but comes from a brilliant understanding of the situation ... the summoning of the Conference in The Hague came in answer to a real need."[97] Nothing else but also nothing less, than the development of history, and in particular of science and technology, led to the emergence of this idea. The German medical scientist and naturalist, Virchow, saw this clearly and de Bloch liked to refer to him: "Countless volumes have been written to investigate the motives for the Tsar's summons. In my opinion, however, one man only indicated the true reason: he was neither a military man nor a diplomat, but an eminent scientist, Rudolphe Virchow: 'It is to science,' he says, 'that we owe the idea of the conference'."[98] It is hardly surprising, then, that "science" stood at the head of the list, drawn up by de Bloch, of causes which had led to the calling of the Conference.[99] Among these he cited "the art of destruction, the last word of the inventive spirit of the nineteenth century;" the remaining causes were merely a further elaboration of this theme and a summary of arguments which showed that a great war would be "impossible" in the future.

De Bloch was, in Fried's felicitous words, "a pragmatist of peace,"[100] and his famous work was, indeed, but an exposition of the theory that recent developments in science and new inventions, with their repercussions on economic and social life, had brought an end to war as an institution. The "Great War" of 1914-18 was to confirm that de Bloch was right, both with regard to details and to the whole. Nothing indicates this better than the frequency with which historians refer to this conflict as "the war of illusions" and to its "illusions of victory."[101] As Barbara Tuchman summed up the War, "When at last it was over, the war had many diverse results and one single dominant transcending all others: Disillusion."[102] Norman Angell's The Great Illusion, published in 1910, argued along de Bloch's lines, albeit less impressively. But von Laue, in his study on Witte (who had been de Bloch's employee) wrote that Witte anticipated Angell's theories by a few years and never mentioned de Bloch at all.[103] De Bloch, in a strictly scientific manner, had reached all of these conclusions twenty years before the onset of the War; yet such was the obscurity that had befallen him by this time.

During the nineteenth century many voices in Europe proclaimed that militarism and war were incompatible with industrialization, which needed peace. In the optimistic vision of Comte and Saint-Simon, Buckle and Spencer, Bright and Cobden, society was on its way to shed its old war apparel -- not so much because people were motivated by higher morals or religious inspiration, but because in an industrial society war could only have a destructive effect. In addition, the industrialization process had made war itself more destructive than ever. Witte and de Bloch, who were both closely connected with the industrialization of Russia in the second half of the last century, subscribed readily to the theory put forward by the above-named

sociologists, historians and others. Closely connected with political life at the highest level, Witte and de Bloch were at the same time conscious of an established class, whose interests lay in the maintenance of the institution which was the basis of their existence and of a way of life in which war still had a function. As Witte remarked, militarism creates a class which is interested in war and increases the probability of war.[104] If de Bloch had ever doubted this, he was soon to be brought back to reality by his insight into the preparations for the Hague Conference. He realized that once more the vested interests of militarism had killed a great chance to make progress in the international relations between nations. Nobody doubted the Tsar's good intentions nor his power to carry them out, at least not in Russia. The opportunity therefore was unique, but the military prevented it from being fully grasped. First, it eliminated from the program the clause that nations must -- not could -- present their insuperable differences (which might lead to war) to an international court of arbitration. This should have been the principal outcome of the Conference, but the respective paragraph did not even reach the agenda. The essence of the whole Conference and the prime objective of the peace movement itself were thereby destroyed. Encouraged by this success, the military then opposed the second fundamental point of the program; disarmament. The Russian delegation had just proffered a detailed program, when the French general staff concluded an agreement with its Russian counterpart to incorporate in the original agenda a series of technical points concerning the prohibition of certain weapons. This diluted the original conception and created a large gap between the Tsar's original intentions and the actual achievements of the Conference.[105]

To explain why so few of the expectations of

the Russian Manifesto were fulfilled, de Bloch often referred to Tolstoi, who said, "an enormous farce has been going on for centuries, and increasing as it goes. It would seem that the first duty incumbent on those who would wish to rid the nations of mutual slaughter and pillage is to reveal to the masses the farce they are enslaved by. The enlightened men of Europe, however, do nothing of the kind, but, under pretext of pursuing the advent of Peace, they meet now in one European town, now in another, and sitting as gravely as possible round a table, they deliberate on the question how to solve the difficulty of war, as if there were any difficulty in liberating a nation from a farce and deceit we clearly see."[106] The average citizen, whose notion of present-day history is shaped by the daily newspaper, has no idea, de Bloch argued, how far-reaching the roots of militarism are, and how damaging its effects -- and this as much in time of peace as in war.[107] The Tsar's plan and the whole Conference were victims of the same phenomenon although, had the Conference been allowed to look at the facts, it would have seen that compulsory arbitration and a reduction in armaments were, far from being utopian, indispensable. De Bloch predicted that the lessons taught by the facts would now be written in blood and branded with fire.

Soon the Boer War proved him right.[108] De Bloch suggested to the English government that it should send experts to the scene of this "small war" to ascertain the new conditions of warfare, including the increasing superiority of the defense. He offered to support such a project financially but even this could not disturb the general apathy and only induced the military to oppose more decidedly the inconvenient theories of this 'amateur'.[109] De Bloch's proposal for a parliamentary investigation was similarly rejected. De Bloch was very disappointed about all this, because he had assumed that a thorough inquiry into the

events in the Transvaal would have confirmed his theory and that consequently it would have met with international acceptance when promulgated from England. In his last year, therefore, he stayed regularly in England, hoping that this country would in the end redeem the unfortunate failure of the disarmament conference: "Therefore I venture now to appeal to the British masses, whose vital interests are at stake and whose verdict must be final."[110] De Bloch died in the middle of his struggle. The Boer War would drag on for another six months and after that "the white-gloved hand of the military man"[111] would dominate the course of events culminating in the 'Great Illusion' of 1914-1918.

1. Up to February 1, 1918 the Julian Calendar was in use in Russia. The corresponding Gregorian date is obtained by adding 12 (19th century) or 13 (20th century) days to the Julian date.

2. Recently an article by Dostojewski written in 1873 was still mentioned as the source of inspiration for the Tsar. Cf. George Katkov & Michael Futrell, "Russian Foreign Policy, 1880-1914," in George Katkov et al., eds., Russia Enters the Twentieth Century, 1894-1917 (London, Temple Smith, 1971), 23.

3. Mainly the Russian ones which were published in 1932 by L. Teleshev in the periodical Krasny Archiv (vols. 50/51 & 54/55). For an inventory, see A Digest of the Krasnyi Arkhiv - Red Archives, ed. by Leona W. Eisele & Andrei A. Lobanov-Rostovsky (Ann Arbor, Univ. of Michigan Press, 1955). Some important documents, relating to the Hague Conference, were translated in the Berliner Monatshefte published by Alfred von Wegerer (June, July 1933 and April, 1934).

4. Most of the time these researchers limit themselves to general or vague remarks, as illustrated by the following selection: Albert Schäffle in 1899 wrote that de Bloch's book "had assisted the peace initiative of the Tsar" ("Die Friedenskonferenz im Haag. Beiträge zu einer sozialwissenschaftlichen Theorie des Krieges," in Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, vol. 55, No. 4, 707). Christian Meurer was of the opinion that "Also pacifist writings, especially (de Bloch's book) had stimulated the attention of the Tsar" (Die Haager Friedenskonferenz, Vol. I, Munich, J. Schweitzer Verlag, 1905, 9). Howard Evans wrote that "a tribute of praise is especially due to

... de Bloch" (Sir Randal Cremer, London, T. Fisher Unwin, 1909, 193). According to Robert Coulet, "Amongst those who can be credited with having brought about indirectly the meeting, the most prominent place belongs to Jean de Bloch" (La limitation des armements, Paris, Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1910, 93). A.C.F. Beales writes "there is evidence ... that Nicholas II was profoundly impressed by the work of ... de Bloch (The History of Peace, London, G. Bell, 1931, 231). Edith Wynner and Georgia Lloyd found de Bloch's book "one of the chief influences which impelled the Czar to call the ... Conference" (Searchlight on Peace Plans, New York, E. P. Dutton, 1946, 80). And a recent author does not proceed beyond the remark that de Bloch's book "was said to have contributed to the tsar's decision" (Roger Chickering, Imperial Germany and a World Without War, Princeton Univ. Press, 1975, 98). A Polish expert on de Bloch confines himself to the observation that the opinion that his work led to the Conference "is quite generally believed but scientifically difficult to verify." Julian Bugajski, "The Genesis of the Military Writings of Jan Bloch," in Historical Studies, No. 15 (48), (Warsaw, 1967), 130 (In Polish).

5. Author's emphasis. Has War Become Impossible? A Conversation with M. Bloch, the Author of 'The Future of War'. Chronicled by W. T. Stead. (London, 'Review of Reviews' Office, 1899), 4.

6. De Bloch, Die wahrscheinlichen politischen und wirthschaftlichen Folgen eines Krieges zwischen Grossmachten. (Berlin, Akademischer Verlag fur soziale Wissenschaften-Dr. John Edelheim, 1901), 11. For further praise, see p. 12.

7. De Bloch to Von Suttner. Cf. Bertha von Suttner, Memoirs, Vol. II. (Boston, Ginn, 1910), 252.

8. E. J. Dillon, "The Tsar's Eirenicon," in The Contemporary Review (November 1898), 615.

9. "The 'Impossibility' of War. John Bloch's book," p. 4. These revelations are by a "Friend of the Author." We have good reason to believe that this is actually E. J. Dillon, who was a professor at Charkov University and Russian correspondent of the London newspaper from 1886 to 1914. We read further on: "His book may or may not have been the only means by which the Tsar was converted to peace, but what is certain is that it materially contributed to bring about this remarkable change in the Russian monarch." The same close connection between de Bloch's work and the Tsar's initiative is made by Dillon two years later in "John Bloch," The New Liberal Review (February 1902), 34-5. That Dillon later changed his mind and considered Witte as the Tsar's inspirator may perhaps be linked to the fact that in 1903 he was nominated personal adviser to Witte. Cf. E. J. Dillon, The Eclipse of Russia (London, J. M. Dent, 1918), 269-78, and his "Illusions of the Belligerents," in The Yale Review (July 1918), 842-3.

10. De Bloch to Stead in Has War Become Impossible?, op. cit., 4.

11. W. T. Stead, The United States of Europe on the Eve of the Parliament of Peace (London, 'Review of Reviews' Office, 1899), 133.

12. W. T. Stead, "Character Sketch. The late M. Jean Bloch," in The Review of Reviews (February 15, 1902), 142.

13. Ibid.

14. W. T. Stead, The United States of Europe, op. cit., 164. This was an important aspect of his study as the following quotation indicates: "I have been attracted to this study of war as much from the desire to improve the condition of the people as from any other source. Hence my book took in part the shape of an investigation of the moral, social and material conditions in which the masses of the Russian peasants pass their lives. It is a painful picture." Cf. Edwin D. Mead, Jean de Bloch and 'The Future of War' (Boston, The International Union, 1903), 7.

15. Von Suttner, Memoirs; op. cit., 252.

16. Von Suttner, Die Haager Friedensconferenz. Tagebuchblätter, 2nd ed. (Dresden and Leipzig, E. Pierson's Verlag, 1901), 34.

17. Quoted in Alfred von Wegener, "Die Komödie der ersten Haager Abrüstungskonferenz. Aus dem Tagebuch des russischen Kriegsministers Kuropatkin," in Berliner Monatshefte (April 1934), 322.

18. Author's emphasis. Von Suttner, Memoirs; op. cit., 216.

19. However, long before her memoirs were published, Bertha von Suttner knew the exact situation. Cf. "Erinnerungen an Johann v. Bloch," in Stimmen und Gestalten (Leipzig, Verlag von B. Elischer Nachfolger, 1907), 125.

20. Hans Wehberg, Die internationale Beschränkung der Rüstungen (Stuttgart und Berlin, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1919), 175-6.

21. Alfred H. Fried, Handbuch der

Friedensbewegung, 2nd ed., Vol. II (Berlin und Leipzig, Verlag der "Friedens-Warte," 1913), 134. Following a conversation with de Bloch in The Hague, Fried wrote: "Through an admiral, now deceased, the young crown prince became interested in this article, and this was with the approval of Tsar Alexander III." A. H. Fried, "Meine Unterredung mit Staatsrath v. Bloch," in Die Waffen Nieder! (No. 6, 1899), 231-3.

22. August Schou, Histoire de l'Internationalisme, Vol. III, Du Congrès de Vienne jusqu'à la première guerre mondiale (1914). (Oslo, L'Institut Nobel Norvégien, 1963), 430.

23. Max Kolben, Wahrheit und Klarheit über die Haager Friedenskonferenz (Berlin, Puttkammer & Muhlbrecht, 1900), 7.

24. Author's emphases. Thomas K. Ford, "The Genesis of the First Hague Peace Conference," in Political Science Quarterly (September 1936), 359. In his standard work, William L. Langer merely writes: "Bloch was said to have been received ... by the Tsar." (The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890-1902. 2nd ed., New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1951, 584).

25. Dan L. Morrill, "Nicholas II and the Call for the First Hague Peace Conference," in Journal of Modern History (June 1974), 296: "Stead ... maintained that Nicholas II had been influenced by Ivan Bloch, a prominent Warsaw banker and member of the State Council, who in his work ... argued that another war would annihilate civilization." Morrill pleads for a re-evaluation of the idealistic and humanitarian motives which are said to have inspired the Tsar -- which Teleshev, writing in 1932, could of course not have

considered possible at all. We sympathize with Morrill's moderately revisionist views, in which an important role, supporting his thesis, should have been ascribed to de Bloch. Morrill is not quite without predecessors. G. Lowes Dickinson believed that rather than political or military motives, "a genuine sense of the evils of the armed struggle, and ... a desire to do something to alleviate it" led the Tsar to his decision. (The International Anarchy, 1904-1914, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1926, 356). Frieda Hoffmann wrote in the same way: "As is already brought out by his character portrayal, any kind of intimate preoccupation with politics was alien to him. He was, however, ... full of universal, pacifist dreams, which corresponded with his impressible nature and his mystical leanings." (Beiträge zur Vorgeschichte der ersten Haager Friedens-konferenz von 1899, Hamburg, Hans Christian, 1935, 35).

26. The Memoirs of Count Witte, ed. by Abraham Yarmolinsky (London, William Heinemann, 1921), 21.

27. Christian L. Lange, "Histoire de la Doctrine Pacifique et de son Influence sur le Développement du Droit International," in Academie de Droit International, Recueil des Cours (Paris, Hachette, 1927), 404. See also Léopold Boissier, "L'Union Interparlementaire et sa Contribution au Développement du Droit International et à l'Etablissement de la Paix," ibid. (1955, II; Leyden, A. W. Sijthoff, 1956), 186.

28. Note from Kuropatkin's diary, dated September 23, 1898, quoted in von Wegerer, op. cit., 326-7.

29. Ford, op. cit., 359 (who mentions the fact

that it was known that the Tsarina completely dominated her husband); Michael Priklonsky, "Die Vorgeschichte der ersten Haager Friedenskonferenz," in Die Friedenswarte (May 1929), 131. Morrill (op. cit., 306-8) discusses the role played by Nicholas's mother, Maria Fedorowna, who opposed the peace initiative. The Tsarina's countervailing influence is not mentioned. One gets a strong impression of confusion between the two female protagonists (Cf. Morrill's explanation, op. cit., 308, with Kuropatkin's, note 28).

30. E. J. Dillon, "John Bloch," op. cit., 33. Stead, who also reports on this, says: "The outside world knows him only as the prophet of the impending extinction of war, but in Warsaw he was better known as the advocate of all good humanitarian work." "Character Sketch," op. cit., 141.

31. Quoted in Beatrix Kempf, Suffragette for Peace. The Life of Bertha von Suttner (London, Oswald Wolff, 1972), 45. See also her "Beginn und Geschichte der bürgerlichen Friedensbewegung 1815-1918," in Wiener Blätter zur Friedensforschung (Nos. 24/25, July/Aug. 1980), 71.

32. Document No. 271 in G. P. Gooch & Harold Temperley, eds., British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, Vol. I. (London, HMSO, 1927), 222. The first "His Majesty" refers to the Emperor, the second one, however, to the Tsar.

33. Van Stoetwegen to de Beaufort (Archives Dutch Min. Foreign Affairs). The author is grateful to Michael Bloch, who drew his attention to this letter.

34. Document No. 4350 in Johannes Lepsius et al., eds., Die Grosse Politik der

Europäischen Kabinette, 1871-1914, Vol. XV. (Berlin, Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, 1924), 349-54. The quotation is mentioned on pp. 349-50.

35. Ibid., 349. Obviously, from what has been said before about the Tsar's familiarity with de Bloch's early work, one could conclude differently.

36. Lepsius et al. point out that Komarow erroneously mentions the Peace Congress held in Budapest in 1895. Ibid., 350. From the extensive literature on this "connection," see Merze Tate, The Disarmament Illusion. The Movement for a Limitation of Armaments to 1907 (New York, Macmillan, 1942), 85-97. W. T. Stead writes that Salisbury's speech about the arms race of November 9, 1897 induced Basily to resume his plans for a peace conference: "...he was reinforced by M. de Bloch, whose famous book ... created a marked impression on the mind of the Tsar." Stead, ed., The M.P. for Russia. Reminiscences and Correspondence of Madame Olga Novikoff, Vol. II. (London, Andrew Melrose, 1909), 402. Stead thus sees a connection between Basily and de Bloch but places the initiative with the former.

37. Die Grosse Politik, op. cit., 351-2. Research in the French diplomatic archives could probably shed more light on this.

38. Ibid., 352.

39. The course of events in Russian diplomatic circles, from the publication of the Second Manifesto to the opening of the Conference, as described in von Radolin's letter, is most grotesque, and conveys an impression of veracity. Ibid., 352-3. No wonder that Andrew D. White, who headed the American delegation, later explained:

"It was found that all was haphazard; that no adequate studies had been made, no project prepared; in fact, that the Emperor's Government had virtually done nothing showing any real intention to set a proper example." Autobiography of Andrew Dickson White, Vol. II. (New York, The Century Co., 1905), 28. One can indeed regret that de Bloch was not in charge.

40. Langer calls Komarow's story -- to which he only refers in a note, without saying anything about the contents -- "apparently trustworthy" (op. cit., 584). Komarow is mentioned, together with von Suttner and Fried, as one of those who pointed out de Bloch's importance for the realization of the Conference. Frieda Hoffmann (op. cit., 26) writes: "We believe that the details concerning the preparatory stages of the memorandum as well as the dates, which Komarow gives, can be assumed to be correct." When she discusses de Bloch's possible role, she, too, overlooks completely what Komarow has to say about it (35-7).

41. Ford, op. cit., 360. In this connection it is worth mentioning that Ford apparently had no knowledge of the important article in which Priklonsky, former Secretary of the Russian Consulate General in Budapest and close collaborator of Basily, gives his view of the pre-history of the Hague Conference (op. cit.). This applies also to Morrill, op. cit., (see in particular p. 303, note 34). For the reliability of Priklonsky's remarks and the importance of his role, see: Michael Freiherr von Taube, Der grossen Katastrophe entgegen. Die Russische Politik der Vorkriegszeit und das Ende des Zarenreiches (1904-1917). (Berlin und Leipzig, Georg Neuner, 1929),

184. Hans Wehberg writes in "La contribution des conferences de la Paix de la Haye au Progres du Droit International," in Recueil des Cours (1931, III; Paris, Sirey, 1932), 546: "I understand from several Russian diplomats that the first item in the archives of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the first Hague Conference consists of a memorandum by Priklonsky which concludes with the necessity for general disarmament."

42. Jackson H. Ralston, International Arbitration from Athens to Locarno, (Stanford Univ. Press, 1929), 254. The little which Ralston related about de Bloch surpasses, however, what is to be found in a study published a year earlier, in which the question is raised about de Bloch's influence. Although the writer refers to Komarow elsewhere, precisely on this occasion he fails to do so! He merely reaches the conclusion that pacifist writings (of Stead, von Suttner and Fried) contradict each other in this matter (sic). (August Junk, Die Mächte auf der ersten Haager Friedenskonferenz (1899), Borna-Leipzig, Universitätsverlag von Robert Noske, 1928, 7-8). Jacob Ter Meulen was one of the few who acknowledged de Bloch's role as it comes to the fore from documents in Die Grosse Politik... -- however, as he remarked, not without ambiguity. He saw that this was an "interesting problem;" unfortunately, he did not elaborate. Exposition en l'honneur d'André Carnegie au Palais de la Paix 25 nov.-15 déc. 1935. L'arbitrage et la juridiction internationaux pendant les cent dernières années (The Hague, Marinus Nijhoff, 1936), 59.

43. He had recently written a booklet, Der ewige Friede, in which he attacked the idea of peace. Von Stengel was a member

of the German delegation.

44. The ambassador's remarks may give rise to the question whether de Bloch was asked to become an official member of the delegation. This seems unlikely. See also below.

45. B. von Suttner, "Zur Vorgeschichte der Haager Konferenz," in Deutsche Revue (December 1901), 352; Memoirs, op. cit., 228.

46. Ibid., 217-9. A clear echo of de Bloch is also to be found in a declaration made by Muraviev to the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, von Bülow. In August 1897, i.e. a year before the First Manifesto appeared, he confided to him in St. Petersburg that "A European war would involve very serious dangers for the internal state of Russia." In his publications de Bloch had already discussed these dangers in great detail. Prince von Bülow, Memoirs, Vol. II. (London & New York, Putnam, 1931), 86-7.

47. Stead, The U.S. of Europe, op. cit., 136; von Suttner, Memoirs, op. cit., 216-7.

48. Stead, ibid.; de Bloch, Impossibilités techniques et économiques d'une guerre entre grandes puissances. (Paris, Paul Dupont, 1899), 10.

49. Document No. 264 in Gooch & Temperley, op. cit., 217.

50. We are aware that Witte's views, upon which we base ourselves here in part, can be misleading -- Witte was not a modest figure, and he liked to belittle other people's roles. See above.

51. Report quoted in The New York Times (May

20, 1899), 1.

52. Von Suttner, Memoirs, op. cit., 235-6.

53. The Herald of Peace (May 1, 1899), 211.

54. Von Suttner, Memoirs, op. cit., 239-40.

55. Charles Letort, "Société d'Economie Politique. Réunion du 5 Octobre 1899," in Journal des Economistes (October 15, 1899), particularly pp. 122-4.

56. B. von Suttner rightly wrote: "Moreover, by no means have all experts shown themselves to be opponents of Bloch's theory; on the contrary, it was in the very ranks of the highest military men that he met with approval, and many of his expositions are founded on the remarks of military specialists." Stimmen und Gestalten, op. cit., 126.

57. Quoted in de Bloch, "The Wars of the Future," in The Contemporary Review (September 1901), 312. However, after this enviable praise for de Bloch, Miliutin added that he feared he was expecting too much: "...the appalling consequences which may be expected to follow the catastrophe are not capable of turning back the obstinate fanatics of militarism from the road which they have mapped out for themselves."

58. "Die Waffen Nieder!" in Die Zukunft (May 20, 1899), 329.

59. Quoted in R.E.C. Long, "Count Tolstoy in Thought and Action," in The Review of Reviews (May 15, 1901), 440. Long visited Tolstoi in early 1899.

60. Ibid., 439.

61. War Against War! (March 17, 1899), 148. As a result of Tolstoi's article, the periodical was prohibited in Russia. Tolstoi wrote that, at the same time as the Russian government was making its quasi-peaceful intentions known to the world, it was persecuting the most peaceful and peaceloving people in Russia, the Doukhobors, because they refused military service. Tolstoi's letter, which first appeared in The Daily Chronicle of February 15, 1899, was an answer to a letter from Swedish conscientious objectors who had asked for his opinion on the inclusion, on the agenda of the Conference, of the subject of alternative service. (Cf. "An address to Count Tolstoy. The refusal to bear arms," in War Against War!, January 20, 1899, 31; and "Count Tolstoi on Peace Conference. His Reply to the Swedish Memorialists," in op. cit., February 24, 1899, 98.) Stead answered Tolstoi's letter with a critical article (in which he called Tolstoi's principle of passive resistance a logical "reductio ad absurdum") and, probably in order to keep the balance, with a lengthy excerpt from one of Tolstoi's books, which gained the author a place in Stead's series, "Gallery of Peace Apostles." Taking the above mentioned into account, it is remarkable to hear Wehberg (Recueil, op. cit., 548) speak of an optimistic Tolstoi, "who affirmed that success was certain because the times were propitious." A somewhat different view of Tolstoi's attitude appears in the Advocate of Peace (of December 1898!). According to this report, Tolstoi had an interview with the Tsar in the early days of 1899, during which the Tsar allegedly persuaded Tolstoi of his sincere belief in, and genuine enthusiasm for, the Peace Conference. This is not as surprising as the fact of

the meeting itself. Patterson, to whom we owe this reference, believes that Tolstoi must have been misquoted, since shortly afterwards he criticized the Conference and repeated the view that lasting peace could only result from massive civil disobedience towards a government that demands military service of individuals in order to perpetuate violence and organized murder. Cf. David S. Patterson, Toward a Warless World. The Travail of the American Peace Movement, 1887-1914 (Bloomington, Indiana Univ. Press, 1976) p.96 and note 14, p. 287. Also, in an investigation by the Neue Hamburger Zeitung, reproduced in "Äusserungen hervorragender Persönlichkeiten über das Czarenmanifest," (in Die Waffen Nieder! No. 10/11, 1898, 395-6), Tolstoi is said to have expressed himself favorably about the proposed Conference.

62. Stead's sympathy for the peace movement does not detract from his assertion that in The Hague de Bloch was "in many respects, much the most remarkable figure ... no one among all the representatives of the foreign nations who were present at the Dutch capital was more interesting or more worthy of attention." Character Sketch, op. cit., 137.

63. The texts of these presentations were published. For details of these and other writings by de Bloch, see my: A Bibliography of the Pacifist Writings of Jean de Bloch (London, Housmans, 1977).

64. B. von Suttner, Der Kampf um die Vermeidung des Weltkriegs. Randglossen aus zwei Jahrzehnten zu den Zeitereignissen vor der Katastrophe, Vol. I. (Hrsg. von Alfred H. Fried, Zürich, Orell Füssli, 1917), 545-6. Also Stead , "M. Bloch's lectures were among the chief

social events at The Hague;" Character Sketch, op. cit., 139.

65. Von Suttner, Der Kampf, op. cit., 546-8.

66. Von Suttner, Die Haager Friedensconferenz, op. cit., 164.

67. Stead, Character Sketch, op. cit., 138.

68. Alfred H. Fried, Unter der Weissen Fahne! Aus der Mappe eines Friedensjournalisten (Berlin, Hermann Walther, 1901), 198-9.

69 Von Suttner, Memoirs, op. cit., 281, 293: Die Haager Friedensconferenz, op. cit., 97, 126, 160.

70. W. Evans Darby in The Herald of Peace (July 1, 1899), 245. Darby, however, mentions a limited interest.

71. Quoted in Calvin DeArmond Davis, The United States and the First Hague Peace Conference (Ithaca, Cornell Univ. Press, 1962), 99.

72. De Bloch's room, wrote an English pacifist who also visited him, "with its parcels of war-books stacked all along the walls, looks more like an arsenal than a salon." Felix Moscheles, "Impressions at The Hague," in G. H. Perris A History of the Peace Conference at The Hague (London, International Arbitration Association, 1899), 14-16. De Bloch's popularization of his book through pamphlets was a good idea. As von Suttner remarked, most of the people attending the Conference had indeed had the monumental, "house-high" (de Staal) work in their hands, but had not read it -- only a few could muster up the courage to plod through six heavy, large volumes (Die Haager Friedensconferenz, op. cit., 97). The

book which the Dutch government handed out to all delegates at the start of the Conference also contained an excerpt from de Bloch's book.

73. V. Gribayedoff, "The Outer Fringe of the Peace Conference," in Black & White (June 3, 1899), 680, 669-70.

74. R.E.C. Long, who provided the translation of an English edition of de Bloch's book, wrote that a much more suitable title for the book would have been: "A Cyclopaedia of modern life - In its four thousand pages may be found in elaborate detail almost every fact of importance in the life of modern Europe." "Jean de Bloch," in The Fortnightly Review (February 1902), 235.

75. Letter from William Lavino to Moberley Bell, May 25, 1899 (Archives of The Times. First Series. Lavino).

76. Von Suttner, Die Haager Friedensconferenz, op. cit., 162-3, 171. Bell, however, could not show the same enthusiasm as his famous reporter. In a letter dated July 3, he informed him that an article of de Bloch's which Lavino had transmitted, was to be published - "though rather out of deference to the author's personality than on its own exceedingly dubious merits. It does more credit to his heart than to his head!" (Archives of The Times. First Series. Lavino. Letterbook 4, p. 398).

77. The Manchester Guardian, June 6, 1899, p. 7.

78. Von Suttner, Memoirs, op. cit., 289.

79. Heinrich Lammasch, Seine Aufzeichnungen, sein Wirken und seine Politik (Hrsg. von Marga Lammasch & Hans Sperl. Wien und

Leipzig, Franz Deuticke, 1922), 16. Lammasch wrote that besides the official delegates also some leading pacifists played a significant role -- "most notably ... Bloch."

80. Von Suttner, Memoirs, op. cit., 263-4.

81. White, op. cit., 262.

82. Von Suttner, Die Haager Friedensconferenz, op. cit., 236.

83. Von Suttner, Memoirs, op. cit., 293: "I learn that some Russian military members of the Conference were very indignant ... and demanded his arrest."

84. Stead, Character Sketch, op. cit., 139.

85. Ibid., 138-9.

86. Fried, Unter der weissen Fahne!, op. cit., 179-80.

87. Document No. 4327 in Die Grosse Politik, op. cit., (Vol. XIII, 1924), 312-4.

88. Fried, Unter der weissen Fahne!, op. cit., 198. The aforementioned English weekly, Black & White, wrote that a "special relationship" existed between de Bloch and the Tsar (op. cit., 670).

89. However, the opposite was (is) sometimes heard. In "Der Zukunftskrieg und die Haager Conferenz," in Allgemeine Militär-Zeitung (June 22, 1899), 393, de Bloch is called "a member of the Hague Conference." In an obituary in The Jewish Chronicle, January 10, 1902, p. 13, it is said: "He himself was one of the Russian representatives at that memorable gathering." The editor of Theodor Herzls Tagebücher Vol. II (Berlin, Jüdischer

Verlag, 1923), 617, calls de Bloch "a Russian diplomat, Russian delegate to the Peace Conference." So does, to quote a recent example, Mieczyslaw Maneli, "Peace and Freedom," in International Problems, Nos. 2-4, (Tel Aviv, 1981), 34-5. To judge by his commitment, de Bloch was much more than that: he was a delegate of the world's knowledge and conscience.

90. The Diaries of Theodor Herzl (Ed. by Marvin Lowenthal, London, Victor Gollancz, 1958), 312-7. See also Tulo Nussenblatt, Ein Volk unterwegs zum Frieden (Theodor Herzl -- Bertha v. Suttner), (Vienna, Reinhold Verlag, 1933), esp.the chapter "Theodor Herzl and the First Peace Conference in the Hague," pp. 111-34. In the standard biography of Herzl, de Bloch is called "the man whose initiative was responsible for the calling of the Conference." (Alex Bein, Theodore Herzl, Philadelphia, The Jewish Publ. Soc. of America, 1940, 319-21).

91. Whether this declaration suggests that de Bloch here, consciously or unconsciously, referred to his own experience, must be left unanswered.

92. Friedrich I, Grand-Duke of Baden, was an ardent admirer of Herzl, and "the most significant representative of liberal and national sentiments among the German princes." Herzl had already been received by the Emperor himself on several occasions. (The Diaries of Theodor Herzl, op. cit., 453).

93. Ibid., 317. We have not found confirmation of Adolf Böhm's allegation that Herzl's intervention with the Grand-Duke was successful. Cf. Die Zionistische Bewegung, 2nd ed., Vol. I (Berlin, Jüdischer Verlag, 1935), 196. It is

known, however, that after staying two days in Berlin, where he was received by the Emperor, Zorn, on his return, announced that Berlin was no longer unconditionally against arbitration. Herzl's letter to the Grand-Duke and de Bloch's memorandum to de Staal are to be found in Theodor Herzls Tagebücher, op. cit., 323-4 & 328-9. Herzl asked de Bloch to insist also with Witte on the cancellation of the embargo in Russia on the sales of shares of the Jewish Colonial Trust. Later he endeavored to have de Bloch play a mediating role during the Boer War (Ibid., 329-34, 517-21, 551).

94. The Diaries of Theodor Herzl, op. cit., 314. From this report, if true, it appears that the Tsar was very sincere.

95. Report in The Herald of Peace, (June 1, 1899), 222.

96. Von Suttner, Memoirs, op. cit., 235. The alleged influence of her novel, Die Waffen Nieder! on the Tsar is well known. Not so well known, though, are her efforts in 1897 to bring another novel, Schach der Qual, to the attention of the Tsar. In this novel, she describes the call for a peace conference by one of the most powerful heads of state in Europe. Cf. Memoirs, op. cit., 135, 169-71. In a Dutch analysis of de Bloch's work, an interesting comparison is drawn with von Suttner's. While she appeals to feelings and implores, de Bloch challenges the mind and argues. Considering the Tsar's character, it appears that not tears but figures affect him: "Thus to assume that the tears from Die Waffen Nieder! influenced him, is, to say the least, highly improbable. It is more likely that the cold figures, the dry tables, the scientific demonstration, and the hard

argumentation in ... de Bloch's book have started him thinking." Cf. "Het boek van de maand. De oorlog der toekomst door Johann von Bloch," in De Hollandsche Revue (May 1899), 368. Following reports in the press, Bertha von Suttner declared that she was convinced that de Bloch's study had exercised more influence on the Tsar than her "imagined story." ("Erklärung," in Die Waffen Nieder!, No. 12, 1898, 492-3). The joint influence of de Bloch's and von Suttner's writings may have been considerable -- yet it is premature, without further substantiation, to write, as Walter Schücking does: "Today it is already ... a historical certainty that, without the stimulus provided by the books of B. von Suttner and ... Bloch, the Tsar would hardly have issued the Hague invitation." (Der Bund der Völker, Studien und Vorträge zum organisatorischen Pazifismus, Leipzig, Der Neue Geist Verlag, 1918, 132-3). The same reservation also applies to the statement by a leading Dutch commentator on international affairs who attended the Conference and wrote, in an article commemorating its 25th anniversary, "It can be regarded as certain that nothing made a stronger impression on the young Tsar than the reading of the purely scientific work of his compatriot, de Bloch." (Henri van der Mandere, 'Indrukken en herinneringen van de Eerste Haagsche Vredesconferentie," in Vragen van den Dag (Amsterdam), Vol. 39, June 1924, 423).

97. De Bloch, "L'Allemagne et la Paix Armée," in La Revue et Revue des Revues, (November 15, 1900), 363.

98. Ibid. Between 1883 and 1893, Virchow was also a member of the Reichstag. He had already, on October 21, 1869, on behalf of the Progressive Party of the Prussian House of Representatives, insisted on

diplomatic negotiations for general disarmament. Cf. Fried, Handbuch, op. cit., 79-80. In an interesting document in which he surveyed "The History of the Propaganda against War," and which he drew up, in German, just before the opening of the Conference, de Bloch wrote that it is very likely that each of the popular assumptions concerning influences on the Tsar (including his own book) contained an element of truth. But the main factor was the evolution which had taken place in the nature of war, and which the Tsar must have noticed when, still as heir to the throne, he studied these matters. See the typed MS in the archives of the International Peace Bureau in the United Nations Library in Geneva (Collection Suttner-Fried). Divers correspondants. Gg7, 9 pp.).

99. De Bloch, Programme de la Conférence faite le 31 octobre 1900 au théâtre du Mans (1900), 2.

100. Fried, Die Haager Conferenz (Berlin, Hugo Bermühler Verlag, 1900), III.

101. Cf. a.o. Fritz Fischer, Marc Ferro.

102. Barbara W. Tuchman, August 1914 (London, Constable, 1962), 426.

103. Theodore H. von Laue, Sergei Witte and the Industrialization of Russia (New York, Columbia Univ. Press, 1963), 156.

104. Ibid., 191. He attributed, as others did, the prosperity of the U.S.A. to the circumstance that this country did not have a standing army.

105. De Bloch, "Militarism in Politics, and Lord Roberts' Army Organisation Scheme," in The Contemporary Review (December

1901), 770-1.

106. De Bloch, The Work of the Peace Societies: How to Widen Their Programme (Chatham, "Observer" Works, 1901), 9-10. The question can be asked whether with this "farce" Tolstoi only referred to the military class and its intrigues - as de Bloch did - or whether he referred to the whole state apparatus, as one might expect from his anarchist position.

107. De Bloch, "Militarism in Politics," op. cit., 764.

108. Ibid., 773.

109. Ibid., 776. For a fascinating (and at times hair-raising) account of the rearguard action of the army against the implications of the new technology and tactics, as well as of its general reaction to de Bloch's arguments, see T.H.E. Travers, "Technology, Tactics and Morale: Jean de Bloch, the Boer War, and British Military Theory, 1900-1914," in The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 51 (Chicago, June 1979), 264-86.

110. De Bloch, The Wars of the Future, op. cit., 305.

111. De Bloch, "Militarism in Politics," op. cit., 767, 769.

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